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Abstract: Abstract: Abstract: Abstract:       
This paper focuses on dynamics of government spending over the business cycle. 
The literature on this topic has yet mainly focused on the issue of anti- or pro- 
cyclicality of fiscal policy. Only recently some researchers brought up a notion that 
response  of  fiscal  policy  might  display  great  deal  of  asymmetry  with  respect  to 
economic upturns and downturns. 
This is known as cyclical bias which arises when government expenditure increases 
more in cyclical downturns than it decreases in cyclical upturns, or vice versa. 
Empirical estimates of the sign and degree of cyclical bias show strong evidence in 
favour  of  the  hypothesis  that  fiscal  authorities  do  react  with  a  great  deal  of 
asymmetry.  Among  other  things,  the  presence  of  cyclical  bias  in  government 
spending has been proposed as an explanation or mechanism which lies behind its 
unprecedented increase in most OECD countries over the last several decades. 
The aim of this paper is to show that a similar asymmetry of government spending 
dynamics can also be found in fiscal data of new EU member countries. We estimate 
the sign and degree of cyclical bias and compare it to estimates from other countries. 
Finally,  we  tackle  the  question  of  whether  there  is  any  statistically  significant 
influence of political economy variables on the estimated degree of asymmetry. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper deals with dynamics of government expenditure over the course of the 
business cycle. Our main focus is a possible asymmetry of this dynamics with respect to 
economic upturns and downturns. 
So  far,  both  the  theoretical  and  the  empirical  literature  on  this  topic  has  mainly 
focused on issues related to pro- or anti-cyclicality of government expenditure, implicitly 
assuming  that  the  reaction  of  government  expenditure  is  symmetric  with  respect  to  the 
business cycle.
1 Yet, there is no reason to assume government spending behaves the same 
way during recessions as it behaves during expansions. This is what we define as cyclical bias 
in government spending: presence of asymmetric dynamics of government expenditure with 
respect to the business cycle, more specifically, with respect to positive and negative output 
gaps. 
Is  there  any  cyclical  bias  in  government  expenditure?  How  big  is  it  and  in  what 
direction? Is it common to all components of public spending or not? How does composition 
of government, elections or other political economy factors influence it? And how does pro- 
or anti-cyclicality of fiscal policy relates to it? Those are the question we try to answer. 
An introduction of the basic econometric specification to be estimated will facilitate 
the discussion. We estimate   
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where  it g  is government expenditure to GDP ratio in country i and year t and  it y  is the gap 
between  actual  and  potential  output,  which  we  split  into  expansionary  periods  (
+
it y )  and 
recessionary periods (
−
it y ),  i α  is a country i specific constant and  it ε  is assumed to be i.i.d. 
zero-mean, constant-variance error. 
This specification allows us to answer two questions. The first one is whether there is 
an asymmetry in the behaviour  of government  spending.  This would  manifest itself as  a 
                                                
1 See Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004) and Persson and Tabellini (2003) for rare exceptions.   2 
difference in the estimates of  1 β  as compared to  3 β  or, alternatively, in different estimates of 
2 β  and  4 β . The second question is whether there is a cyclical bias in government spending. 
To answer this question, we define the coefficient of cyclical bias as  4 3 2 1 β β β β φ − − + = . 
Note that if government spending increases during expansions, then  0 1 > β  and  0 2 > β and if 
government  spending  increases  during  recessions,  then  0 3 < β   and  0 4 < β .  What  the 
coefficient of cyclical bias tells us is that after a hypothetical four-year business cycle, during 
which output rises one percent above potential in the first year, drops to its potential in the 
second year, decreases one percent below its potential in the third year and returns back to 
potential in the fourth year, government spending to GDP ratio will be φ -percent higher. 
We must stress that the issue of cyclical bias is to a certain degree orthogonal to the 
issue of pro- or anti-cyclicality of government spending. When  0 , 2 1 < β β  and  0 , 4 3 < β β , 
fiscal policy is counter-cyclical and it is pro-cyclical if the inequalities are reversed.
2 But 
when all four coefficients are equal in absolute value, the coefficient of cyclical bias will be 
zero. It is when fiscal policy is more anti-cyclical during recessions than during expansions or 
alternatively,  when  fiscal  policy  is  more  pro-cyclical  during  expansions  than  during 
recessions that cyclical bias arises. 
Specification  (1)  also  makes  explicit  an  assumption  which  underlies  most  of  the 
literature on pro- or anti-cyclicality of fiscal policy. Most of this literature implicitly assumes 
that  the  elasticity  of  government  expenditure  with  respect  to  the  output  gap  is  equal  in 
economic upturns and downturns, i.e. that  3 1 β β =  and  4 2 β β = , and subsequently fails to 
separate positive and negative output gaps. But if the true data generating process is given by 
(1), then regressions of public expenditure on a lumped measure of the output gap will be 
misspecified. 
Since evidence about cyclical bias in government spending for OECD countries is 
presented in Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004), which also served as major inspiration for 
our work, we investigate the issue at hand using fiscal and economic data for ten new EU 
member countries.
3 The reason for using data for new EU member states is twofold. First, 
fiscal behaviour of those countries has so far received only limited attention. In this respect 
our  work  contributes  to  already  existing  literature.  Second,  using  dataset  for  a  different 
sample of countries allows us to compare our estimates with those for the OECD countries, 
which in itself can be of interest. 
To give a flavour of our findings, we regard two of our conclusions as most important. 
Using data on new EU member countries, we do find a great deal of asymmetry of fiscal 
                                                
2 Some of the existing literature seems to be rather unclear on this, so we must clarify meaning of pro- 
or anti-cyclicality. Note that when the public expenditure to GDP ratio is a-cyclical then public expenditure 
expressed in levels moves proportionally with GDP, in other words, if expressed in level terms, it is pro-cyclical. 
On the other hand, when public expenditure in level terms is a-cyclical, it is anti-cyclical when expressed as 
GDP  ratio.  What  we  mean  when  we  say  pro-cyclical  fiscal  policy  is  that  expenditure  to  GDP  ratio  (our 
dependent variable) is positively correlated with the GDP gap, i.e. increases during good times. The reverse 
holds for anti-cyclicality and gives rise to inequalities and their interpretation just mentioned. 
3 Ten new member countries which joined EU on May 2004 are Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia.   3 
policy with respect to business cycle. Government spending increases over the course of the 
business cycle mainly as a result of strong increases during recessions which are not offset by 
equivalent decreases during expansions. 
The  second  thing  our  data  reveal  is  that  some  of  the  asymmetry  is influenced  or 
induced by political economy factors. Probably the most important factor is the composition 
of government and, to a lower degree, the occurrence of general parliamentary elections. 
We proceed as follows. Next section relates our work to the existing literature and we 
try to motivate and structure our thinking about cyclical bias within a non-formal and verbal 
model,  capturing  what  we  think  are  the  most  important  features  determining  cyclical 
behaviour of government spending. This guides our empirical strategy which is the substance 
of the third section. Section four tackles questions related to robustness of our findings and 
other econometric issues. Section five concludes the paper. Details about data are given in the 
appendix. 
2. Relation to Existing Literature 
This paper is broadly related to several strands of existing literature. The first is a 
rather technical literature which estimates the elasticity of the budget surplus with respect to 
output fluctuations in order to compute cyclically adjusted budget balance.
4 
The second body of work compares cyclicality of fiscal policy across a wider sample 
of countries. The conventional wisdom that emerged is that fiscal policy is anti-cyclical or a-
cyclical in most developed countries (usually defined as OECD countries), while it is (often 
strongly)  pro-cyclical  in  developing  countries  –  see  e.g.  Talvi  and  Vegh  (2000).  Several 
explanations have been offered to account for this observed pattern of cyclical behaviour. 
Catao and Sutton (2002) and Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004) argue that developing 
countries become credit constrained during economic downturns which precludes government 
from  effectively  smoothing  economic  fluctuations.  As  a  result,  government  expenditure 
increases during good times and decreases during bad times, i.e. fiscal policy becomes pro-
cyclical. 
This  view  has  been  challenged  based  on the argument  that  it  seems unlikely that 
financial  markets  would  systematically  limit  governments  in  developing  countries  from 
borrowing  during  recessions.  Alesina  and  Tabellini  (2005)  show  that  most  of  the  pro-
cyclicality  of  fiscal  policy  in  developing  countries  can  be  explained  by  high  levels  of 
corruption in those countries. Several other political economy factors have been shown to 
have an impact on cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy. Hallerberg and Strauch (2002) show 
that fiscal policy is less anti-cyclical in EMU countries in election years. Sorensen, Wu and 
Yosha  (2001)  document  similar  impact  in  U.S.  states  and  document  also  an  impact  of 
conservativeness of political representation and of presence of fiscal rules on the cyclical 
behaviour of fiscal policy. Lane (2003)  finds that higher power dispersion (more players 
                                                
4 See Suyker (1999) and Noord (2000) for OECD, Bouthevillain et al. (2001) for European Central 
Bank and Hagemann (1999) for IMF’s approach. Röger and Ongena (1999) and European Commission (2000; 
2002) provide overview of approach to cyclically adjusted budget balance in context of Stability and Growth 
Pact.   4 
within political system with veto power) increases pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy in OECD 
countries.  Similarly,  Henisz  (2004)  finds  that  political  systems  with  stronger  checks  and 
balances display lower volatility in a wide range of public spending categories. 
The  only  work  we  are  aware  of  which  systematically  investigates  the  possible 
asymmetry of fiscal policy with respect to the business cycle is Hercowitz and Strawczynski 
(2004) who document on data for OECD countries strong increases in government spending 
during recessions, which are not offset by equal decreases in expansions. As a result, they 
estimate that over the stylized business cycle mentioned above, government expenditure to 
GDP ratio increases by 0.86 percent, that is, their estimate of the coefficient of cyclical bias is 
86 . 0 = ￿ φ . 
Several  theoretical  models  have  been  proposed  to  explain  empirically  observed 
phenomena. Aizenman, Gavin and Hausmann (1996) build a model with endogenous credit 
constraints. Alesina and Tabellini (2005) build a model where a high degree of corruption 
means that surpluses accumulated in good times when fiscal policy is anti-cyclical are not 
optimal  because  the  electorate  knows  that  corrupt  political  representation  would 
misappropriate them. It is then rational for the electorate to demand higher spending during 
expansions, i.e. pro-cyclical fiscal policy. 
In Persson and Tabellini (2000, ch.4) imperfect information about the true state of the 
economy by electorate allows politicians to divert some extra resources to discretionary use in 
good times, but to spend all tax revenues on public goods provision during bad times. If we 
interpret discretionary spending, for example, as subsidies, one would expect pro-cyclical 
behaviour of this spending category. 
Within  the  model  of  Austen-Smith  (2000)  a  positive  technology  shock  induces 
previously  unemployed  voters  to  enter  the  workforce  which  lowers  average  employee’s 
income with the implication that the preferred income tax rate and degree of redistribution 
increases.  Similarly,  Tornell  and  Lane  (1998;  1999)  build  a  model  where  positive 
technological shocks induce a voracity effect. The voracity effect arises because demand for 
specific transfers by special interest groups increases in expectation of higher government 
revenue in the future. This higher demand, if met, results in an increase of public expenditure 
which more than offsets the increase in revenue, resulting in pro-cyclical fiscal policy. 
Unfortunately, none of the models mentioned above attempt to model asymmetric 
behaviour  of  fiscal  policy.  Because  we  don’t  want  to  be  left  unguided  in  our  empirical 
investigation of the matter, we want to outline a model which would structure our thinking. 
Consider a two-stage game with three players. One player is the finance minister who 
sets the budget in the first stage knowing that in the second stage, nature determines whether 
the economy is in a good or bad state. If the economy happens to be in the good state, the 
previously budgeted expenditure turns out to be unnecessarily high, while if the economy 
happens to be in the bad state, previously budgeted expenditure turns out to be too low. 
Suppose further that the finance minister prefers the public budget to be optimal in a sense 
that it corresponds to the state the economy happens to be in, but because he does not know 
nature’s move, cannot set it optimally in advance.   5 
It is then finance minister’s task in the second stage to propose a change to the budget 
within a government. This change has to be approved by majority rule. Suppose that there are 
two other players, spending ministers, who prefer not optimal, but higher expenditure under 
any state of the economy. One possible way to model the second stage would be a bargaining 
game in the spirit of Baron and Ferejohn (1989). 
Now it is easy to see the implications of our setup. If the economy happens to be in a 
bad state, the finance minister’s proposal will be to increase the expenditure of (possibly) both 
spending  ministers.  Clearly,  such  a  proposal  finds  only  limited  opposition  and  public 
expenditure increases. 
On the other hand, during good times, finance minister’s proposal would be to lower 
public expenditure. Such a proposal would not gain much support from spending ministers 
and would be turned down. In other words, during expansions, public expenditure would be 
too high. Note that this setup yields an extreme prediction of increase of public expenditure 
during recessions and constancy during expansions.
5 
To make the predictions less extreme, suppose that one of the spending ministers is 
from the same party as the finance minister and thus internalizes part of his disutility from 
non-optimal budget. Then this spending minister can vote for a decrease of public expenditure 
during good times. In the terminology of Baron and Ferejohn (1989), a spending minister 
from the same party is a cheaper coalition partner than the other spending minister. 
Note that this opens two possible ways for the finance minister to bring the budget 
closer to the optimal value in a good state of the economy. One way is when the government 
is not too fragmented, in the sense that he can find allies who can be induced to vote for his 
proposal.  Another  way  is  for  the  finance  minister  to  lover  the  expenditure  of  only  one 
spending minister and bring the budget closer to optimality in this way. 
This argument also suggests that we should expect different cyclical behaviour for 
different spending categories. Some spending ministers might be more important or powerful 
than others or opposition by the general public might force the finance minister not to propose 
cuts for certain types of spending. Or one can add influence of interest groups who demand 
higher spending during good times in the sense of the voracity effect mentioned above which 
increases opposition to proposed spending cuts. Another important factor can be the strength 
of the finance minister within the cabinet. 
Thus we have several predictions about cyclical behaviour of public spending. First, 
we expect expenditure to increase by a larger amount in recessions than it decreases during 
economic  expansions,  especially  for  politically  sensitive  parts  of  the  budget,  with  social 
spending as our prime suspect. 
Second, we expect composition of government to influence the degree of cyclical bias. 
Based on the argument given above, we would expect lower cyclical bias for less fragmented 
                                                
5 The finance minister could solve his problem by setting the budget in the first stage optimal for good 
times, which would subsequently require adjustment (increase) only if the state of the economy turns out to be 
bad. However, this is true only if finance minister knows exactly how bad or good times look like and if he sets 
the budget to his full discretion in the first stage. If good and bad times are distributed, for example, uniformly, 
meaning that there can be different good and different bad states, the finance minister cannot solve his problem 
in this way, if he does not have full discretion over the budget in the first stage.   6 
governments. On the other hand, less fragmented governments can be more prone to electoral 
manipulation of the budget and thus,  besides stronger  cyclical bias in  election years, we 
cannot say anything about effect of government fragmentation a priory. 
Third, based on the voracity  effect argument, we expect those parts of the public 
budget which benefit special interest groups to increase in expansions, with subsidies and 
capital spending as prime examples. 
Finally, we expect a weaker position of the finance minister to be associated with 
stronger cyclical bias. In the next section, we shall see how our priors square with the data. 
3. Cyclical Bias Estimates 
This section presents our key findings regarding dynamics of public spending in new 
EU  member  countries.  We  first  focus  on  general  government  expenditure  dynamics  and 
compare it with findings from two other samples of countries. We then shift our attention to 
dynamics of different components of public budgets and finally investigate the impact of 
political economy variables. 
Throughout this section, the basic econometric specification will be of the form  
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where  it g d log  is (log) change of the fiscal variable under consideration expressed as the ratio 
to GDP in country i and year t. On the RHS, variable 
+
it y  (
−
it y ) is positive (negative) output 
gap defined as (log) deviation of GDP from its Hodrik-Prescott trend in country i and year t, 
i α  is a country specific constant and  it ε  is zero-mean constant-variance error. 
Given the likelihood of lag in timing of government expenditure during the business 
cycle, we include one year lag of cyclical variables. We are concerned with reaction of public 
spending to output fluctuations on the one hand and with the sign and size of the coefficient 
of cyclical bias which we define as  4 3 2 1 β β β β φ − − + =  on the other. 
All the estimations are fixed effect panel estimates. Use of fixed effect model is in 
most  cases  implied  by  Hausman  test  (against  use  of  random  effect  model).  Since 
heterogeneity across countries can be of concern, we use fixed effect estimation with cross 
section weights and use heteroskedasticity consistent (robust) standard errors. 
3.1. Government Expenditure 
Table  1  shows  estimates  of  specification  (2).  Column  (1)  is  based  on  general 
government expenditure for new EU member countries. As a benchmark we also include 
estimates  for  15 old EU  member countries
6  based on general government  expenditure  in 
column (2). Column (3) shows estimates for a panel of 60 countries used by Persson and 
Tabellini (2003), where the dependent variable is central government expenditure.
7 
                                                
6  Old  EU  member  countries  are  the  12  Eurozone  members:  Austria,  Belgium,  Finland,  France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain plus Denmark, Sweden and UK. 
7 See data appendix for description of variables and their sources. Also, when interpreting the estimation 
results, we use following terminology for the estimates on the output gap variables (top to bottom in the table): 
first  expansion  year,  second  expansion  year,  first  recession  year  and  second  recession  year.  Keeping  our   7 
Table 1: Cyclical Bias Estimates 
  (1) 
new EU member states 
(2) 
old EU member states 
(3) 
Persson and Tabellini 
(2003) dataset 
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2 R   0.63  0.53  0.14 



















N  104  381  1777 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * , ** , *** significant on 10%, 5% 
and 1% level respectively. Hausman test statistics for fixed vs. random effect test 
with degrees of freedom and p-value. Sample: 1993 - 2006 for column (1), 1970 -
2006 for column (2) and 1961 - 1998 for column (3). 
The estimates in column (1) indicate the following dynamics of public expenditure. In 
the first year of an expansion, public spending decreases, indicating anti-cyclical fiscal policy. 
However, this decrease is more than offset during the second year of expansion, in which 
expenditure shows a strong tendency to increase, in line with the voracity hypothesis. Turning 
to recession years, during its first year, public expenditure increases indicating again anti-
cyclical  fiscal  behaviour.  However,  in  the  second  recession  year,  public  expenditure 
decreases, rendering fiscal policy pro-cyclical. 
Comparing estimates for the first year of the business cycle, although fiscal policy 
behaves anti-cyclically, the reaction is stronger in recession than expansion years. In other 
words, an increase of expenditure during the first year of recession is not offset by a matching 
decrease during expansions, in line with our hypothesis of asymmetry of dynamics of public 
spending. This logic carries on to the second year of business cycle despite pro-cyclicality of 
fiscal policy. Expenditure shows a strong tendency to increase during the second year of 
expansion with much weaker tendency to contract during the second year of recession. 
The estimated behaviour translates into the cyclical bias estimate equal to 1.14, which 
is both statistically and economically significant. A few back-of-the-envelope calculations 
demonstrate what the estimate means. Taking the estimated coefficient at face value and 
multiplying by the mean output gap in our sample of 3.2 percent suggests that after average 
cycle government expenditure to GDP ratio increases by 3.6 percent. Further multiplying by 
                                                                                                                                                   
hypothetical business cycle outlined above in mind, we say that the fiscal policy is pro-cyclical (anti-cyclical) if 
the estimate is positive (negative). Off course, pattern of a business cycle can be much more complicated in 
which  case  actual  change  of  the  dependent  variable  will  be  given  by  the  sum  of  the  relevant  estimated 
coefficients  (depending  on the  position  during  the  business  cycle),  but describing  all the  possibilities  would 
greatly complicate and lengthen the exposition.   8 
the mean government expenditure to GDP ratio of 44 percent suggests increase by 1.6 percent 
of GDP. 
A similar pattern emerges from estimates in column (3). Estimates suggest precisely 
the same logic as estimates for new EU member states with the difference that the estimated 
coefficient  of  cyclical  bias  is approximately half in size, yet  still statistically significant. 
Column (2) shows some notable differences. For old EU member countries, the drop in public 
spending during the first expansion year is larger than the increase of expenditure during first 
recession year, contrary to our hypothesis that it is easier to increase than decrease public 
expenditure.  However,  this  is  ‘compensated’  by  strong  pro-cyclical  expenditure  increase 
during second expansion year, which is only partially offset by pro-cyclical decrease during 
second  recession  year.  Overall,  estimated  coefficient  of  cyclical  bias  is  still  positive  but 
statistically insignificant at conventional levels (p-value of 0.14). 
Our explanation of the different degree of cyclical bias in new EU member countries 
compared to the estimates in columns (2) and (3) is that the estimates in column (1) are based 
on  a  considerably  shorter  time  period.  Obviously,  government  expenditure  to  GDP  ratio 
cannot increase for ever. Sooner or later cyclical ratcheting of government expenditure has to 
come to an end (or requires repeating corrective spending cuts if it prevails). The fact that 
eight out of ten new EU member countries are post-communist economies which might still 
be on its way to ‘steady state’ level of public expenditure to GDP ratio might be the reason 
behind the relatively high estimate of cyclical bias. 
3.2. Decomposition of Expenditure 
We now turn to the dynamics of different components of public expenditure in new 
EU member countries. Table 2 columns (1) through (5) include estimates for compensation of 
employees (EMP), social expenditure (SOC), final consumption expenditure (FCE), subsidies 
(SUB) and finally for capital expenditure (CAP). 
Table 2: Cyclical Bias of Expenditure Items 
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EMP git =  
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2 R   0.80  0.39  0.49  0.33  0.26 




























N  120  118  123  120  112 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * , ** , *** significant on 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. Hausman test statistics for fixed vs. random effect test with degrees of freedom and p-
value. Sample: 1991 - 2006 for all columns.   9 
The first thing to notice about the estimates included in table 2 is generally much 
lower precision compared to the estimates in table 1. Our explanation is that the dynamics of 
separate components of expenditure is much more given by idiosyncratic shocks which ‘even’ 
out in aggregate total expenditure category. 
Nevertheless,  the  estimates  in  columns  (1)  and  (2)  show  similar  behaviour. 
Compensation  of  employees  and  social  spending  show  no  tendency  to  decrease  during 
expansions and a strong tendency to increase during recessions, in line with our hypothesis of 
asymmetric behaviour. As a result, for both spending categories, the coefficient of cyclical 
bias is statistically significant. 
The estimates in column (3) are in general insignificant with the exception of a strong 
anti-cyclical response during the first expansion year. Similar results hold for column (4) 
where only the estimate for the first expansion year comes close to statistical significance (p-
value of 0.11), suggesting a strong pro-cyclical reaction of subsidies. Column (5) then in 
general points to pro-cyclical behaviour of capital expenditure with the exception of the first 
recession  year,  although  the  only  estimate  which  is  significant  is  for  the  second  year of 
expansion. Overall, the estimates of cyclical bias in columns (3) through (5) are insignificant 
and closest to statistical significance is the estimate for capital expenditure (p-value 0.11). 
Overall,  the  estimates for the different categories of public spending give a much 
fuzzier picture than the estimates for total expenditure. The estimates for social spending and 
employee compensation categories, which can be regarded as politically sensitive ones, come 
close to what we expected. The combination of increases during recessions and no decreases 
during expansions results in cyclical ratcheting. Subsidies and capital expenditure, spending 
categories where we expected the voracity effect to play a key role, fulfil our expectations 
only partially. Although the estimate of cyclical bias for both spending categories is positive, 
sizeable and given by strong pro-cyclical behaviour during expansions, it is not statistically 
significant. 
3.3. Political Economy Influence 
This  section  investigates  how  political  economy  factors  influence  the  degree  of 
cyclical bias. Throughout the section, our dependent variable will be the general government 
expenditure and we will expand our basic specification to  
   
it it it it it it it it it
it it it it it i it
y z y z y z y z
g y y y y g d
ε γ γ γ γ
β β β β β α
+ + + + +












1 1 4 3 1 1 2 1
1 5 1 4 3 1 2 1 log
      (3) 
where all the variables are defined as before and  it z  is a political economy variable in country 
i and year t. 
We must stress that results in this section should be taken with a grain of salt. The first 
thing to notice is that by adding one political variable  it z  we are effectively adding four RHS 
variables and coefficients to be estimated. Having at most 14 observations for any country in 
the sample and despite the fact that we add only one political variable at a time, we might be 
stretching the data too much.   10 
Second, although Hausman statistics suggests in several cases that the random effect 
model should be used, we use fixed effect estimation. There are several reasons for this. One 
is that the random effect model requires that the number of coefficients to be estimated is 
lower than the number of cross sections. Since we have ten coefficients in (3) and equal 
number of cross sections, we do not want to push the data too far. Another reason is that 
estimating the model with fixed effects when random effect estimation should have been used 
still yields consistent estimates. The only thing we jeopardize is loss of efficiency. And lastly, 
Hausman statistics are in most cases just within a reach of the rejection region, which leaves 
considerable hope that error we fall into is not substantial. We still use fixed effect estimation 
with cross section weights and report heteroskedasticity consistent (robust) standard errors. 
Last thing to be added is that the estimates of  1 β  through  4 β  in (3) no longer have 
such  a  straightforward  interpretation  as  in  the  preceding  sections.  Take  for  example  the 
change of public expenditure (in politically average country) in the first year of an expansion. 
It will be given by  ( ) z yit 1 1 γ β +
+  where  z  is the average of  it z . Therefore, the coefficient of 
cyclical bias defined previously as  4 3 2 1 β β β β φ − − + =  captures only part of the dynamics. 
For that reason we will focus on an estimate calculated as  4 3 2 1 γ γ γ γ φ − − + =
P  which we 
call politically induced change in cyclical bias or political cyclical bias for short. Moreover, it 
is easy to see that overall cyclical bias can be calculated as  z
P ⋅ + = ′ φ φ φ . Having said that, 
we are ready to state our results. 
Table 3A: Political Economy of Cyclical Bias 
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2 R   0.59  0.59  0.63  0.84  0.67  0.63 




























N  93  93  93  93  70  93 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * , ** , *** significant on 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Hausman test 
statistics for fixed vs. random effect test with degrees of freedom and p-value. Sample: 1993 - 2005 for all columns.   11 
 
Electoral Influence 
We first look at the influence of elections on the degree of cyclical bias. For this 
purpose,  it z  in (3) is a dummy variable which takes the value of unity in years of general 
parliamentary elections. The first two columns of table 3 show our results. 
Focusing  on  column  (1),  we  see  that  elections  during  expansionary  years  do  not 
change the behaviour of public expenditure. What matters is when elections take place in the 
first recession year, in which case they are associated with a stronger anti-cyclical response or 
in other words, with a stronger increase of public expenditure. A similar result holds for the 
second  recession  year  although  the  estimated  coefficient  is  not  statistically  significant  at 
conventional  level  (p-value  of  0.12).  As  a  result,  the  political  cyclical  bias  is  positive 
indicating that the asymmetry in expenditure dynamics found in the preceding sections is 
more of a concern in election years. However, as a result of no impact of elections during 
expansions, it turns out to be statistically insignificant. 
One  possible  concern  with  elections  is  that,  at  least  some  of  them  might  be 
endogenous. Column (2) addresses this question by excluding those elections which took 
place before the end of regular electoral cycle from our election dummy variable. The fact 
that the results almost do not change suggests that electoral endogeneity is of no concern. 
Political Fragmentation 
Next we want to address the question how political fragmentation interacts with the 
dynamics of public expenditure. Existing literature on this topic usually investigates how the 
number of different political parties in the cabinet or parliament affects fiscal outcomes. 
Roubini  and  Sachs  (1989a;  1989b)  were  among  the  first  to  focus  on  government 
fragmentation. They use a variable ranging from zero for a majority government composed of 
one political party to three for a minority government in their regressions. They find that 
minority governments are characterized by more lax fiscal policies and higher budget deficits. 
Their findings have later been challenged by Haan and Sturm (1997) and Haan, Sturm and 
Beekhuis (1999) who show the that original variable capturing fragmentation of government 
is inappropriate. Subsequently Volkerink and Haan (2001), Balassone and Giordano (2001), 
Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) and Ricciuti (2004) use several different variables to capture 
political fragmentation and in general find more fragmentation to be associated with ‘worse’ 
fiscal outcomes. 
Variables  often  found  significant  are  number  of  effective  parties  in  cabinet  or 
parliament,
8 number of political parties in the cabinet or parliament, or number of spending 
ministers in the cabinet. Columns (3) through (5) of table 3 show our results when we use 
those variables. 
                                                
8 Effective number of parties is defined as the reciprocal of the sum of squared vote shares of individual 
parties either in cabinet or parliament, or in other words, as a reciprocal of Herfindahl’s index of concentration. 
We experimented with this measure of concentration and results turned out to be disappointing and thus are not 
reported. We also experimented with a variable defined as in Roubini and Sachs (1989a; 1989b) with similar 
(disappointing and not reported) results.   12 
In column (3), the political variable  it z  is the number of political parties in cabinet 
(NOCP). What the estimates show is that fragmented governments influence the dynamics of 
public  expenditure  mainly  through  a  more  pro-cyclical  response  during  the  first  year  of 
economic expansion, in other words, through a strong increase of public expenditure during 
those years. A similar logic holds for the second expansionary year, while the number of 
political parties in the cabinet does not seem to have an impact on the dynamics of public 
expenditure  during  recession  periods.  The  resulting  political  cyclical  bias  is  positive  and 
unlike electoral influence, it is statistically significant. 
Column  (4)  displays  estimates  for  the  number  of  political  parties  in  parliament 
(NOPP). As opposed to the number of political parties in cabinet, parliaments composed of 
more parties do not, according to our estimates, have any effect on the dynamics of public 
expenditure. 
Column (5) investigates the impact of the number of spending ministers (NSM) on the 
cyclical  bias.  The  estimated  coefficients  show  a  rather  puzzling  pattern  characterized  by 
stronger pro-cyclical behaviour associated with more spending ministers in the first expansion 
and recession years. On the other hand, cabinets with more spending ministers pursue more 
anti-cyclical fiscal policy during second expansion and recession years. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the estimated coefficients are all statistically significant is in 
line with the findings of Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) who find the number of spending 
ministers to have an especially strong effect on the behaviour of public expenditure. Despite 
that,  the  implied  political  cyclical  bias  is  too  low  to  be  statistically  and  economically 
significant. 
Weak Finance Minister 
One of the features of the model we outlined is that the cyclical bias is caused by the 
fact that the finance minister faces opposition of spending ministers when the decision about 
public expenditure in the cabinet is made. This suggests that a weaker position of the finance 
minister should be associated with a stronger cyclical bias. For this reason we use a dummy 
(MFCH) taking the value of unity in years when the minister of finance has been replaced. 
Results are depicted in column (6).
9 However imperfect this measure of the finance minister’s 
strength might be, we hope that new finance ministers find it harder to resist the pressure for 
expenditure increases or are less able to push their colleagues into expenditure cuts. 
The results partially confirm our intuition. Governments with a new finance minister 
engage  in  more  pro-cyclical  fiscal  policy  during  the  first  expansion  year  and  more  anti-
cyclical policy during the first recession year. As before, such a behaviour points to a stronger 
increase (weaker decrease) of public expenditure during recessions (expansions). As a result, 
                                                
9 We are aware of the literature which tries to capture different institutional features of budget process 
and  their  impact  on  fiscal  outcomes  and  which  usually constructs  index  of minister  of  finance  influence  or 
power. However, such an index is inappropriate for our empirical strategy because it does not change over time 
and  thus  cannot be used  in  panel  data estimation.  We  refer  interested  reader  to  Hagen  and  Harden (1995), 
Hallerberg  and  Hagen  (1999),  Hallerberg,  Strauch,  and  Hagen  (2001),  Gleich  (2003),  Ylaoutinen  (2004)  or 
Hallerberg, Strauch, and Hagen (2004) for this line of research.   13 
politically induced cyclical bias caused by a weaker finance minister is quite sizeable and 
statistically significant. 
To  summarize  our  findings,  we  have  (maybe  tediously)  repeated  over  and  over  a 
similar scenario with respect to interaction of political economy variables with the dynamics 
of public expenditure. A stronger pro-cyclical response during expansions combined with a 
stronger anti-cyclical response during recessions results in a positive estimated politically 
induced change in cyclical bias. This is true especially for the impact of general parliamentary 
elections, the number of political parties in government and governments with new finance 
ministers. 
On  the  other  hand,  results  also  show  that  the  number  of  political  parties  in  the 
parliament has no impact on the dynamics of public expenditure and thus induces no political 
cyclical bias. And lastly, despite the fact that the number of spending ministers in the cabinet 
has an impact on the dynamics of public expenditure, it is hard to interpret its pattern and 
results in statistically and economically insignificant political cyclical bias. 
4. Econometric Issues and Robustness Checks 
In  this  section,  we  want  to  tackle  several  econometric  issues  which  have  gone 
previously unmentioned and to subject our findings to several robustness checks, so as to 
make us confident that they are not the result of spurious correlation. Especially, we will be 
interested  in  whether  the  asymmetric  dynamics  of  public  expenditure  and  the  resulting 
cyclical bias we reported in the first column of table 1 for new EU member countries which 
we regards as our main finding survives closer inspection. 
Bias in Dynamic Panels 
The first issue is the well known bias in dynamic panels estimated with fixed effects 
(see  for  example  Baltagi  (2005)).  It  is  also  known that the size of this bias  is inversely 
proportional  to  (time)  length  of  the  panel.  Having  on  average  ten  observations  for  each 
country, we hope that this problem cannot put our findings into serious doubts. 
Also, since we are in many cases interested in the size of the cyclical bias, which is 
given as  4 3 2 1 β β β β φ − − + = , any bias in individual estimated coefficients will not affect 
resulting φ . 
Poolability of Data 
Another question is whether the data used are suitable to be estimated by a method 
which imposes the restriction that  1 β  through  5 β  are equal across countries when estimating 
specification (2). To check whether the data used are suitable for pooling, we estimate a 
specification  analogous  to  (2)  for  each  country  separately  and  compute  the  mean  group 
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ψ ψ , where  i ψ  is a vector of the estimated coefficients  1 β  
through  5 β   for  each  country  i.  As  Pesaran  and  Smith  (1995)  show,  this  estimator  is 
asymptotically consistent but less efficient when the homogeneity assumption holds. We want   14 
to compare  MG ψ  with the estimated coefficients for the new EU member countries in table 1 
which we will denote by  FE ψ . We use a Hausman test to compare  MG ψ  and  FE ψ , using test 
statistics  given  by  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) FE MG FE MG FE MG V V H ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ − − ′ − =
−1   where  ( ) MG V ψ   and 
( ) FE V ψ   are  estimated  variance-covariance  matrices  of  the  mean  group  and  fixed  effect 
estimators  respectively.  As  suggested  by  Pesaran,  Smith  and  Im  (1996)  the  variance-
covariance  matrix  of  the  mean  group  estimator  can  be  computed  as 











ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ . 
If our data are suitable for fixed effect estimation, this test will not reject the null 
hypothesis of homogeneity (poolability). We compute  H  which is under the null hypothesis 
distributed as 
2 χ  with degrees of freedom equal to the dimension of  FE ψ . Table 4 shows both 
FE ψ  and  MG ψ  as well as computed H  and its p-value. 
Table 4: Poolability test 







































Notes: Hausman test statistics for poolability of 
data. Sample: 1993 - 2004 for both columns. 
Table 4 shows that the mean group estimates are in general less precisely estimated 
but are of equal sign as the fixed effect estimates. Also, the Hausman test statistics does not 
reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity and thus suggests that the restrictions we put on the 
parameters by pooling are not inappropriate. 
Robustness Checks 
To further test our findings, we alter the basic estimation procedure. Table 5 shows the 
result of this exercise. In all cases, we report the estimated degree of cyclical bias, as well as 
the difference between the estimated coefficient for expansion and recession years and its 
statistical significance. The reason for this is that when the estimate for an expansion year is 
higher than the estimate for a recession year, its difference will be positive which points to 
asymmetric dynamics of public expenditure, namely it shows a stronger increase of public 
expenditure during recessions which is not offset by a decrease during expansions.   15 
Table 5: Robustness Checks 
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it un ∆             0.02 
(0.01)
*       
2 R   0.63  0.42  0.48  0.66  0.87  0.64  0.33  0.36  0.29 
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N  104  104  107  103  84  100  77  104  94 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (except for columns (8) and (9)). * , ** , *** significant on 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Sample: 1993 - 2006 
for columns (1), (2), (4), (6) and (8), 1992 - 2006 for column (3), 1993 - 2004 for column (5), 1991 - 2001 for column (7) and 1994 – 2006 for column (9). For 
description of columns see text. Hausman test statistics for fixed vs. random effect test with degrees of freedom and p-value. Last two rows give difference between 
expansion and recession estimates for  t  and  1 − t  respectively.  it un ∆  is (log) difference between unemployment and its trend. 
For ease of comparison, column (1) repeats the estimates already given in table 1. 
Column (2) uses non-weighted fixed effect estimation. Column (3) shows results when total 
current expenditure, as opposed to total expenditure, is used as the dependent variable to 
estimate specification (2). In column (4), we replace the positive and negative output gap on 
the RHS of equation (2) by the difference between the growth of real and potential output, 
again  split  into  positive  and  negative  values.  This  is  the  independent  variable  used  in 
Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004). In all cases, the estimated cyclical bias is positive and 
statistically significant. Also, the difference between estimated coefficients for expansion and 
recession  years  is  positive  but  in  general  only  significant  when  second  expansion  and 
recession years are compared. 
Column (5) restricts the sample to end in year 2004. How did we manage to get data 
up to 2006? The reason is that the AMECO database which is the source of our economics 
data contains data up to year 2007. Fiscal data in this database are updated twice a year after 
spring  and  autumn  ‘fiscal  notification’,  during which EU member  countries present their 
latest data. Based on information provided by national officials, the European Commission 
(EC) services then form a forecast, currently until year 2007. We downloaded data we use 
after 2005 autumn update and thus for 2005 data used are preliminary and for year 2006   16 
predicted.  Since  we  repeatedly  struggle  with  shortage  of  data,  we  sinned  by  running 
regressions on sample ranging up to 2006.
10 
Column (6) adds change in trend unemployment into specification (2). The reason for 
adding unemployment is that it might influence the dynamics of public expenditure, since at 
least part of it is tailored to relieve the consequences of difficult social position of citizens. 
The  reason  for  adding  trend  unemployment  is  that  we  want  to  avoid  problems  with 
collinearity with output variables. 
Both columns (5) and (6) show that our basic results about positive cyclical bias do 
not change considerably, although the estimated cyclical bias is reduced somehow. Also, in 
both cases the difference between the estimates for second year of expansions and recessions 
is positive and statistically significant. However, the difference between the coefficients for 
first year of expansions and recessions is negative in column (5) and insignificant in column 
(6). 
Column (7) displays results when we use central government expenditure taken from 
IMF’s government finance statistics (GFS) as the dependent variable. Overall discrepancy of 
the results in this column with the rest of our results is immediately evident. Not only do both 
recession coefficients lose statistical significance, but the overall estimate of cyclical bias is 
virtually zero. One immediate explanation is that the previously reported cyclical bias is in 
fact due to behaviour of local governments and thus shows only in general government data. 
Nevertheless, we do not favour this explanation for several reasons. The first one is linked to 
the low number of observations we were able to obtain from GFS database. 
But the key to the absence of cyclical bias is in our view the methodology of GFS used 
to compile fiscal data. GFS is based on a cash principle, as opposed to the accrual principle 
which lies behind ESA95 methodology on which the AMECO database from which most of 
the data used so far come.
11 This difference means that the GFS database and methodology 
leaves much public expenditure unrecorded and contains notable errors. Its low precision is 
also the reason why GFS 2001 has been developed by IMF and is now being used to record 
public expenditure instead. However, GFS 2001 has not been retroactively applied to years 
preceding  its  introduction  which  means  that  it  contains  only  few  observations  for  each 
country. 
On the other hand, the ESA95 methodology based on the accrual principle, on which 
national accounts data are also based, is meant to be as comprehensible as possible and tries 
to capture governmental operations which would under GFS be left off-budget. Stress on 
accuracy of ESA95 is also given by the fact that it serves as official statistics of the EC and 
decisions in Stability and Growth Pact framework are based upon it. 
                                                
10 Note that all estimations in section where we study impact of political economy variables end in year 
2005. Also, Hausman test statistics calculated for test of data poolability has been derived on sample ending in 
year 2004 and thus left column in table 4 is equal to column (5) in table 5. 
11  Loosely  speaking,  expenditure  under  the  cash  methodology  are  recorded  at  the  time  when  the 
payment is made. The accrual principle assigns expenditure to the time period where they objectively belong and 
immediately upon the point when they become apparent. Also, GFS has contained several loopholes regarding 
formal definition of government entities which offered opportunity to leave many in nature public expenditure 
unrecorded.   17 
We believe that the combination of a small number of observations and measurement 
error lies behind the non-significance of the findings in column (7). 
The  last  two  columns  display  estimates  when  we  allow  for  autocorrelation  of 
disturbances.  Column  (8) uses a random  effect specification  and column (9) fixed  effect 
specification.  All  the  estimates  still  keep  the  expected  signs,  but  generally  loose  some 
statistical significance. The estimated cyclical bias is still positive but reduced in size and is 
now closer to the estimates reported in columns (5) and (6). 
We further tested whether the cyclical bias reported in table 1 for new EU member 
countries is sensitive to exclusion of individual countries from our panel. Table 6 show results 
of this exercise. 
Table 6: Cyclical bias - countries excluded one at a time 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 


























































































































Notes: Dependent variable is total government expenditure to GDP ratio in columns (1) 
and (2) and total current government expenditure to GDP ratio in columns (3) and (4). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * , ** , *** significant on 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. Sample: 1993 - 2006 for column (1), 1993 - 2004 for column (2), 1992 -
2006 for column (3) and 1992 - 2004 for column (4). 
The entries in the cells of table 6 show the estimated cyclical bias when we exclude 
one country at a time. Columns (1) and (2) are based on the total government expenditure to 
GDP ratio and columns (3) and (4) are based on the total current government expenditure to 
GDP ratio. As a further check, odd columns use data up to year 2006, while even columns use 
data only up to year 2004. 
As table 6 shows, in most cases the estimated cyclical bias is still economically and 
statistically  significant,  with  the  exception  of  cases  when  we  exclude  Slovakia  from  the 
estimations. One natural explanation is that the estimated cyclical bias is driven by a high 
cyclical  bias  in  Slovakia.  To  check  this,  we  estimated  cyclical  bias  separately  for  each 
country, expecting the highest one in Slovakia. However, this turned out not to be the case. 
Only for one combination of dependent variable and sample period in table 6 did Slovakia 
have the largest cyclical bias and even in this case it was highest only by a small margin. In   18 
three other cases, Slovakia does not have the largest cyclical bias (Malta, Czech Republic and 
Lithuania lead in the three remaining cases). 
Although we do not have an explanation for the impact of the exclusion of Slovakia, 
we regard the robustness of the estimates of the cyclical bias to exclusion of other countries as 
confirmation of our basic results. 
Overall, the robustness checks we pursued suggest that the results reported are not due 
to spurious correlation. Nevertheless, in the light of some of the estimates in table 5 we regard 
the estimated cyclical bias from column (1) of this table to be the most optimistic and upper 
bound. 
Note on ‘Standard’ Elasticity Estimation 
This  section  tries  to  show  that  traditional  estimates  of  the  elasticity  of  public 
expenditure with respect to output fluctuations based on one (possibly lagged) output gap 
variable  taking  on  both  positive  and  negative  values  might  be  misleading.  This  is  true 
especially for that part of the literature which uses estimated coefficients of cyclical behaviour 
of fiscal policy as a dependent variable in a second stage of investigation, trying to explain 
their cross-country pattern. For recent examples of this approach, see Lane (2003) or Alesina 
and Tabellini (2005). To illustrate that, table 7 replicates table 1 with the exception that the 
output gap variable is not divided into positive and negative values. 
Table 7: Restrictiveness of Standard Elasticity Estimation 
  (1a)  (1b)  (2a)  (2b)  (3a)  (3b) 
  new EU member states  old EU member states  Persson and Tabellini (2003) 
dataset 
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N  104  104  381  381  1777  1778 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * , ** , *** significant on 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Sample: 1993 -
2006 for (1a/b) columns, 1970 - 2006 for (2a/b) columns and 1961 - 1998 for (3a/b) columns. F-statistics for rejection of 
restrictions as compared to specification in table 1 (corresponding columns) 
Columns (1a) and (1b) correspond to column (1) in table 1 and differ in that column 
(1a) uses also one period lag of output gap, while column (1b) uses only the current output 
gap variable. The remaining columns of table 6 are analogously linked to columns in table 1. 
Focusing on even columns (‘b’ columns) where only current output gap is used in the 
regression,  the  estimates  generally  point  to  anti-cyclical  response  of  public  expenditure. 
However, the inclusion of the lagged output gap into the regressions in odd columns (‘a’ 
columns)  reveals  that  the  pattern  is  more  complicated,  with  anti-cyclical  response  to the 
current output gap and pro-cyclical response to the lagged output gap. 
Note also that the estimates in column (3b) when compared to column (2b) comport 
the with common wisdom that fiscal policy in developed countries is in general anti-cyclical   19 
which is not true for developing countries. Since column (2b) is estimated for old EU member 
countries it can be regarded as representative of fiscal dynamics in developed countries. On 
the other hand, data underlying column (3b) come from many developing countries. 
More importantly, the last rows of table 6 show computed F-statistics for the test that 
the  restrictions  put  on  the  estimates  by  estimating  with  the  overall  output  gap  as  an 
independent variable can be rejected. The unrestricted model in each case corresponds to the 
one given in table 1. Put differently, the F-statistics corresponds to the hypothesis that running 
a regression on the overall output gap does not do much harm to the data. We see that in all 
cases this hypothesis is strongly rejected. 
One obvious objection is that the results in table 6 are fixed effect panel estimates, 
while the usual procedure to estimate the cyclical response of public expenditure is to run a 
regression for each country separately. For this reason we ran a similar regression for each 
country separately and a tested similar hypothesis. 
For the sample of 25 EU member countries, the hypothesis that including a single 
output gap variable taking on positive and negative values is appropriate, as opposed to a 
model with split output gap variables, was rejected for 8 countries on 10 percent significance 
level (8 times for 5 percent) when we also included the lagged output gap and for 20 countries 
on 10 percent significance level when only the current output gap was included in the model 
(15 times for 5 percent). Similar numbers for the sample of 60 countries used by Persson and 
Tabellini (2003) are 16 times on 10 percent significance level when the lagged output gap is 
included (10 times for 5 percent) and 31 times on 10 percent significance when only the 
current output gap is included in the model (26 times on 5 percent). 
Overall, the evidence in table 7 and the results of the tests for individual countries 
suggest  that  asymmetry  in  cyclical  dynamics  of  public  expenditure  is  a  widespread 
phenomenon which has so far gone almost unnoticed. It also suggests that attempts to explain 
cyclical  behaviour  of  fiscal  authorities  based  on  estimates  of  the  elasticity  of  public 
expenditure from a regression model which includes a single output gap variable taking on 
positive and negative values might be misleading. 
5. Conclusion 
We hope everything what has been said so far gives a quite clear picture that the 
government spending behaves asymmetrically over the course of the business cycle. There are 
several consequences and related points to this observation. 
First, the evidence we provided for the sample of ten new EU member countries points 
to a behaviour which exhibits an anti-cyclical response of public expenditure to economic 
recessions, in other words, an increase of public spending during bad times. This increase is 
not subsequently matched by an alike decrease of public expenditure during expansions and, 
thus, the government spending to GDP ratio displays ratcheting behaviour. 
Second,  the  extent  of  observed  asymmetry  is  influenced  by  political  economy 
variables.  Whether  we  focus  on  the  occurrence  of  the  general  parliamentary  elections, 
governments composed of more political parties or governments with new finance minister, 
we  find  positive  politically  induced  cyclical  bias.  With  the  exception  of  the  general   20 
parliamentary  elections,  the  estimated  change  due  to  political  economy  variables  is  also 
statistically  significant.  On  the  other  hand,  we  were  not  able  to  detect  any  meaningful 
influence of the number of political parties in the parliament. Lastly, the number of spending 
ministers within a cabinet does not increase cyclical bias, despite the effect of this variable on 
the dynamics of public expenditure. 
Third, we hope the reported findings are not mere coincidence or result of spurious 
correlation. We subjected our findings to a number of robustness checks with encouraging 
results, which point to the fact that asymmetry in the behaviour of public spending over the 
business  cycle  should  be  taken  seriously,  not  only  in  new  EU  member  countries,  but 
elsewhere as well. 
This  brings  us  to  our  last  point.  We  tried  to  show  that  the  standard  econometric 
practice of estimating the degree of pro- or anti- cyclicality of fiscal policy using an output 
gap variable taking on both positive and negative values can yield misleading results. This 
practise is in many cases rejected by the data as being too restrictive when put under standard 
econometric tests. 
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7. Data Appendix 
This appendix describes the data used in the main body of the paper and lists the 
sources. We first briefly introduce the data other than those for new EU member countries we 
used for comparison (columns (2) and (3) of table 1) and then describe the main dataset used 
in the paper. 
Old EU member countries   22 
The dependent variable is the general government total expenditure to GDP ratio. The 
output gap is the log deviation of GDP in constant prices from its Hodrik-Prescott trend. All 
variables come from the European AMECO database accessed after the autumn 2005 update 
and span from 1970 to 2006 with the average of 25 observations per country. The AMECO 
database can be found on http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators_en.htm. 
Persson and Tabellini (2003) data 
The dependent variable in the dataset is the central government total expenditure to 
GDP ratio. Its primary source is the IMF’s International Finance Statistics. The output gap is 
the log deviation of GDP per capita in constant prices from its Hodrik-Prescott trend (GDP 
from the same dataset). The data span from 1960 to 1998 with an average of 31 observations 
per country. For the list of countries, please see Persson and Tabellini (2003). The dataset was 
downloaded  from  Mr.  Tabellini’s  webpage  and  we  greatly  acknowledge  Mr.  Persson’s 
permission to use it. 
New EU member countries 
Table A1 lists variables for the new EU member countries used in the paper along 
with their basic characteristics. 
Table A1: Data Description 
Variable  N  Mean  St.d.  Min  Max 
Output Gap 
EX  163  0.013  0.033  0  0.232 
RE  163  -0.019  0.038  -0.240  0 
Fiscal Variables 
TE  115  0.441  0.078  0.247  0.788 
TCE  118  0.387  0.058  0.205  0.547 
EMP  130  0.108  0.023  0.029  0.156 
SOC  128  0.233  0.041  0.116  0.344 
CAP  122  0.034  0.010  0.011  0.064 
SUB  130  0.018  0.015  0.005  0.138 
FCE  133  0.203  0.031  0.078  0.286 
CGEXP  77  0.357  0.094  0.125  0.585 
Political Economy Variables 
EL  139  0.24  0.43  0  1 
ELST  139  0.17  0.37  0  1 
NOCP  139  2.61  1.11  1  6.17 
NOPP  139  7.31  3.98  2  29 
NSM  91  12.48  1.74  10  16 
MFCH  154  0.51  0.50  0  1 
 
EX/RE  Positive and negative output gap respectively, defined as the log deviation of 
GDP at constant prices from its Hodrik-Prescott trend. 
TE  Total general government expenditure to GDP ratio. 
TCE  Total  current  general government expenditure  to GDP  ratio. Excludes  capital 
formation and capital transfers from TE. 
EMP  Compensation of employees by general government to GDP ratio. 
SOC  Social transfers both in kind and other than in kind to GDP ratio. 
CAP  Gross fixed capital formation expenditure by general government to GDP ratio. 
SUB  Subsidies to GDP ratio made by general government. 
FCE  Final consumption expenditure by general government to GDP ratio. Is defined   23 
as ‘expenditure incurred by general government on goods or services that are 
used for the direct satisfaction of individual needs or wants or the collective 
needs of members of the community’ (AMECO data manual). 
CGEXP  Central government expenditure to GDP ratio. 
All output gap and fiscal variables come from the AMECO database (except CGEXP) 
accessed after the autumn 2005 update. The data span from 1993 to 2006 with an average of 
more than 10 observations for each country. The CGEXP variable comes from the IMF’s 
Government  Finance  Statistics  and  spans  from  1991  to  2001  with  an  average  of  7 
observations per country. 
EL  Dummy taking on value of unity in years of the general parliamentary elections. 
ELST  EL  dummy  which  excludes  those general parliamentary  elections  which took 
place before the end of the regular electoral cycle. 
NOCP  Number of political parties in the cabinet. For years when the government change 
took place is weighted average of the number of parties in each cabinet, where 
the number of months  the  relevant cabinet has been in power is used as the 
weighing variable. 
NOPP  Number of political parties in parliament (lower house) defined and weighted 
similarly as NOCP. 
NSM  Number  of  spending  ministers  in  the  cabinet.  The  definition  of  a  spending 
minister is similar to that used by Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002). Weighted in 
similar manner as NOCP and NOPP in years when change of cabinet took place. 
MFCH  Dummy taking on value of unity in year when the change of minister of finance 
took place. 
We used numerous sources for political economy variables which include: 
i)  Zarate’s Political Collections  
http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/ 
ii)  European Journal of Political Research annual summary of political events called 
‘Political Data in X’, where X denotes year and we used issues for years from 
1996 to 2004. 
iii)  Elections in Central and Eastern Europe: Results and Legislation – Joint project 
of the University of Essex, IFES and ACEEO   
http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/election.asp 
iv)  Websites  of  national  statistical  offices,  government  websites,  websites  of 
ministries  of  finance  and  in  several  cases  direct  contact  with  government 
officials. 
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